The dispute draws on four Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: Rule 8 (affirmative defenses), Rule 15 (amending pleadings), Rule 16 (pretrial management) and Rule 56 (summary judgment). Together they shape how and when a defense may be asserted.
Younge held a senior position in the Fulton County District Attorney’s Office for about two months before being terminated in July 2019, shortly after informing Paul Howard that she was pregnant. She sued the office for violations of Title VII, alleging that her dismissal was motivated by pregnancy discrimination.
The district attorney’s office answered the complaint without raising the “personal-staff exemption” defense, which shields certain officials from Title VII coverage. At a March 2022 pretrial hearing, the office told the court it intended to move for summary judgment based on that exemption, a defense it had never pled.
Without seeking to amend its answer, the office filed the summary-judgment motion in March 2022. The plaintiff objected, arguing that the late assertion violated pleading rules. A federal magistrate judge allowed the defense and recommended judgment for the DA’s office; the district court adopted that recommendation and entered summary judgment.
The case reached the United States Court of Appeals for the 11th Circuit, which applied its 1988 precedent in Hassan v. U.S. Postal Service. The circuit held that a defendant may introduce an unpleaded affirmative defense at the summary-judgment stage if the plaintiff is not “prejudiced” by the delay. It found no prejudice because Younge could not point to any additional discovery she would have pursued.
Arguments before the Supreme Court
Younge urges a textualist reading of Rule 8(c)(1), which requires a defendant to plead “any” affirmative defenses. She contends that allowing a summary-judgment motion on an unpleaded defense circumvents the stricter standards of Rule 15(a)(2) (which demands a court to weigh “undue delay”) and Rule 16(b)(4) (which requires “good cause”).
The DA’s office counters that the prejudice standard from Hassan aligns with the broader purpose of the FRCP: to resolve cases on their merits rather than on technicalities. It cites Rule 61 (the harmless-error rule) and argues that the historical removal of a blanket waiver provision from Rule 12 supports a flexible approach.
Procedural implications
Both sides emphasize that the core dispute centers on whether an unpleaded legal argument may serve as the basis for a dispositive motion. The plaintiff stresses that the pleading rule expressly obliges a defendant to set forth every affirmative defense in its initial response. The defendant points to the precedent that permits a court to consider a defense not listed in the answer when the moving party demonstrates an absence of prejudice.
The justices agreed to hear the case to determine whether an affirmative defense may be asserted as a basis for summary judgment if not presented earlier in a pleading.
